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ABSTRACT
While traditional equitable analysis requires the balancing of
harms with affected parties and the assessment of the public interest when
considering preliminary injunctive relief, courts have largely declined to
do so in Endangered Species Act litigation. This unique approach stems
from the Supreme Court's landmark 1978 Endangered Species Act
decision, TVA v. Hill. More recent Supreme Court decisions, however,
suggest that TVA should not be read so broadly, and that the traditional
approach to preliminary injunctions offers no exception. This article
examines the development of the TVA's preliminary injunctive relief
approach in the lower courts. It then discusses why this approach is
inapplicable when plaintiffs in Endangered Species Act cases seek to
enjoin non-federal actors. The inapplicability of TVA's injunctive relief
standard to non-federal actors is based on TVA itself as well as recent
Supreme Court decisions that have emphasized the importance of
traditional equitable principles. As a matter of policy, this article also
discusses why the balancing of harms and consideration of the public
interest for non-federal actors offers a more sensible approach for property
owners as well as for endangered species.
There is no power the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires
greater caution, deliberation, and sound discretion, or more dangerous in
a doubtful case, than the issuing of an injunction . ...
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I. INTRODUCTION
Faced with an Endangered Species Act (hereinafter "ESA")
lawsuit, 2 the cost of complying with a citizen plaintiffs 3 demands is no
doubt one of the first things that comes to a defendant's mind.4 And yet,
2 See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (2006).
3 Section 11(g) of the ESA provides that "any person may commence a civil suit on his
own behalf... to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other
governmental instrumentality or agency .. . who is alleged to be in violation of any
provision of this [Act] or regulation issued under the authority thereof." Id. § 1540(g).
"Person" is defined to include "an individual, corporation, partnership, trust, association,
or any other private entity," as well as "any officer, employee, agent, department, or
instrumentality of the Federal Government, of any State, municipality, or political
subdivision of a State" and "any State, municipality, or political subdivision of a State."
Id. § 1532(13); see also TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180-88 (1978) ("Citizen involvement
was encouraged by the Act, with provisions allowing interested persons to petition the
Secretary to list species a species as endangered or threatened and to bring civil suits in
United States district courts to force compliance with any provision of the Act." (citations
omitted) (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(c)(2), 1540(c), (g))). This article deals mainly with
ESA suits against non-federal actors and the requirements that are necessary for an ESA
preliminary injunction against a non-federal actor.
Non-federal actors are most affected by § 9's "take" prohibition, see 16 U.S.C. §
1538(a)(1), and by the requirement that activities on privately owned designated critical
habitat where there is a federal nexus must undergo § 7, see id. § 1536(a)(2),
consultation. See generally Robert Meltz, Where the Wild Things Are: The Endangered
Species Act and Private Property, 24 ENVTL. L. 369, 372-85 (2004) (noting that "Section
9's prohibitions apply to private and public land, and apply regardless of whether critical
habitat has been designated," while "[S]ection 7's impact on the private landowner
occurs only when there is a federal nexus-e.g., when development cannot occur without
issuance of a federal wetlands permit"). Violators of the ESA are subject to significant
civil and criminal penalties, including incarceration. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a), (b).
Property owners are well aware of what the ESA means for land use and development.
See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Back to the Future of Conservation: Changing Perceptions
ofProperty Rights & Environmental Protection, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 987, 996
(2005) ("In effect, the ESA granted endangered species a lien or easement that trumps the
conflicting rights of the land's title-holder. As a result, the ESA barred landowners from
building homes, planting crops, or making other land-use modifications that could alter
species' habitat." (footnote call number omitted)); Jeremy Brian Root, Limiting the Scope
of Reinitiation: Reforming Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, 10 GEO. MASON L.
REv. 1035, 1036 (2002) (noting that § 7 offers "a powerful incentive to enjoin hundreds
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well before the merits of a complaint are decided, the defendant can
expect to face a motion for a preliminary injunction in which the plaintiff
will argue that the economic impacts of an injunction are "irrelevant" and
that in ESA cases, economic hardship "is simply not a factor the court is
permitted to consider in granting an injunction."
Alleging the irrelevancy of economic impacts is consistent with
decisions and articles that suggest that the balancing of harms and
consideration of the public interest should be foreclosed in ESA
preliminary injunctive relief cases. 6 Under this argument, language within
the Supreme Court's landmark ESA decision, TVA v. Hill,7 prevents
courts from using traditional equitable discretion in ESA cases and
mandates that the public interest always favors the imposition of an
8injunction. For example, the Ninth Circuit has cited TVA in holding that
of site-specific projects through a single programmatic injunction"); Jonathan F. Tross,
Insuring Against the Snail-Darter: Insurance for Land Use and the Endangered Species
Act, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 471, 471-72 (2005) (noting that "[t]he discovery of an endangered
species on a property can profoundly impact on the manner in which the property may be
utilized" and suggesting that "it is not unreasonable to expect that many landowners
would be interested in insuring against such a risk through . . . 'endangered species
insurance"').
5 See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Alleged Economic
Impact of Injunction at 4, Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Sutherland, No. C06-1608MJP
(W.D. Wash. May 25, 2007), 2007 WL 5042359; see also Animal Prot. Inst. v. Martin,
511 F. Supp. 2d 196, 197 (D. Me. 2007) (noting that the plaintiff moved "in limine to
limit the Court's consideration of the traditional balance of hardships factor" and
contended that "the balance of hardships is not an appropriate factor under the ESA").
6 See, e.g., Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N. R.R., 23 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1994);
Frederico Cheever, Butterflies, Cave Spiders, Milk- Vetch, Bunchgrass, Sedges, Lilies,
Checker-Mallows and Why the Prohibition Against Judicial Balancing ofHarm Under
the Endangered Species Act is a Good Idea, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv.
313 (1998).
7437 U.S. 153 (1978).
8 See Cheever, supra note 6, at 314 ("[T]he orthodoxy [of TVA] makes sense. The
Endangered Species Act . .. cannot tolerate judicial balancing of species harm and
economic dislocation while still honoring the purpose of the statute-the preservation and
recovery of protected species and the ecosystems on which they depend."); see also
Patrick Parenteau, Citizen Suits Under the Endangered Species Act: Survival of the
Fittest, 10 WIDENER L. REv. 321, 333-34 (2004) (The author compares the traditional
rule for obtaining injunctive relief with the TVA v. Hill rule and concludes that under the
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"[t]he 'language, history, and structure' of the ESA demonstrates
Congress' determination that the balance of hardships and the public
interest tips heavily in favor of protected species." 9
However, it is far from clear that TVA's instruction that the ESA
should be used "to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction,
whatever the cost"1o applies to anything but the limited facts of that
case.11 Moreover, such a mandate stands in sharp contrast to the Supreme
Court's recent reminder in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council 2
that courts must balance the equities and factor in public interest
considerations when fashioning preliminary injunctive relief.13  These
assessments are important hallmarks of preliminary injunctive relief and
may not be considered "in only a cursory fashion," even when a movant
seeks to protect ecological, scientific, and recreational interests, such as
the prevention of injury to marine mammals. 14
While Winter arose under the National Environmental Policy
Act,' 5 the decision reaffirmed traditional notions of equity' 6 and held that
ESA, "[a] court must issue an injunction when it is necessary to effectuate the will of
Congress. Under the ESA, the balance of hardships has already been struck in favor of
reserving endangered species.").
Burlington N. R.R., 23 F.3d at 1511 (quoting TVA, 437 U.S. at 174).
10 TVA, 437 U.S. at 184.
" See infra Part Ill.
12 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008).
13 See id. at 374; see also Jonathan Cannon, Environmentalism and the Supreme Court: A
Cultural Analysis, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 363, 413-14 (2006) ("At least since the onset of the
industrial revolution, equity rules have required that in issuing an injunction a court must
not only consider the irreparability of harm to the plaintiff and the adequacy of legal
remedies but must also undertake a 'balancing of the utilities.' The court weighs the
interests of the parties and makes an assessment of the overall public interest.
Consideration of the costs of injunctive relief as well as the benefits advances equity's
purpose to ensure reason and justice in particular cases.").
" See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 377-78.
1s At issue in Winter was a district court's injunction of the Navy's sonar training
exercises off the coast of southern California. Id. at 373. Specifically, the district court
enjoined the Navy to shut down the military training exercises upon spotting a marine
mammal within 2200 yards of a vessel. Id. Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit
held that a preliminary injunction was appropriate given in part the likelihood that the
Navy had violated the NEPA by failing to prepare an environmental impact statement for
323
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a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction "must establish . . . that the
balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public
interest."' 7  These are two of the four inquiries for a plaintiff seeking
preliminary relief, and both proved fatal for the environmental plaintiffs in
Winter. It was particularly clear that the public interest analysis favored
the vacatur of the Ninth Circuit's controversial injunction against the
Navy:
The public interest in conducting training exercises with
active sonar under realistic conditions plainly outweighs
the [ecological, scientific, and recreational] interests
the training exercises. Id. at 374. NEPA requires in part that federal agencies "to the
fullest extent possible" prepare an environmental impact statement for "every ... major
Federal action[] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C) (2006). While the Court's opinion noted that likelihood of success on the
merits is one requirement for a preliminary injunction, its analysis dealt mainly with the
latter three parts of the test for preliminary injunctive relief: likelihood of irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, the balance of hardships, and public interest
considerations. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374-81 ("[W]e do not address the underlying
merits of plaintiffs' claims.").
16
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as
of right. In each case, courts "must balance the competing claims of
injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or
withholding of the requested relief." "In exercising their sound
discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public
consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction."
Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 376-77 (citations omitted) (citing Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207,
2218-19 (2008)) (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987) and
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)); see also id. at 381 ("An
injunction is a matter of equitable discretion; it does not follow from success on the
merits as a matter of course. .. . [T]he balance of equities and consideration of the public
interest[]are pertinent in assessing the propriety of any injunctive relief, preliminary or
permanent." (citing Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 313 and Amoco Prod Co., 480 U.S. at
546 n.12)).
7 Id. at 374 (citing Amoco Prod. Co., 480 U.S. at 542).
1 See id. at 374, 378 ("[W]e conclude that the balance of equities and consideration of
the overall public interest in this case tip strongly in favor of the Navy.").
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advanced by the plaintiffs. Of course, military interests do
not always trump other considerations, and we have not
held that they do. In this case, however, the proper
determination of where the public interest lies does not
strike us as a close question.' 9
Under Winter, then, the fact that there are environmental interests
involved does not preclude a court from considering other interests when
deciding on preliminary injunctive relief.20 Likewise, as this article will
demonstrate, there are several other reasons why the traditional
requirements of balancing the equities and factoring in the public
interest21 apply when considering preliminary relief against non-federal
actors under the ESA, notwithstanding TVA.2 Supreme Court decisions
suggest that TVA is a narrow decision and that traditional equitable
19 Id. at 378. Notwithstanding the injunction, some commentators had expressed
displeasure that a lawsuit against the Navy had even been filed in the first place. See,
e.g., David Nieporent, When Whale It End?, OVERLAWYERED, May 17, 2007,
http://overlawyered.com/2007/05/when-whale-it-end ("Of course environmental groups
are the ones filing these repeated lawsuits, but in the big picture, the blame for this
situation should be laid at the feet of Congress, which passes vague environmental laws
which create broad standing allowing infinite numbers of random bystanders to sue
without having to suffer tangible personal harm.").
2 0 See PLF Liberty Blog, Supreme Court to Lower Courts: Environmental Interests are
not the Only Ones to Consider, http://plf.typepad.com/plf/2008/1 1/supreme-court-to-
lower-courts-environmental-interests-are-not-the-only-ones-to-consider.html (Nov. 12,
2008, 22:46 PST).
21 See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374 (citing Munafj 128 S. Ct. at 2218-19; Amoco Prod Co.,
480 U.S. at 542; and Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 311-12); see also Thomas R. Lee,
Preliminary Injunctions and the Status Quo, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 109, 130 (2001)
(noting that preliminary relief should be granted only if "it appear[s] that greater damage
would arise to the plaintiff by withholding the injunction, in the event of the legal right
proving to be in his favor, than to the defendant by granting the injunction in the event of
the injunction proving afterwards to have been wrongly granted" (alteration in original)
(quoting WILLIAM KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INJUNCTIONS IN
EQUITY 209-10 (1st ed. 1867))); David S. Schoenbrod, The Measure ofan Injunction: A
Principle to Replace Balancing the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV.
627, 636 (1988) (discussing the basic doctrine of balancing the equities).
22 See infra Part III.
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discretion should be abandoned only in very limited circumstances. 23
Traditional equitable discretion is also proper because it puts
constitutionally-protected property rights on par with the statutorily-
protected rights of endangered species.24 Courts that issue preliminary
injunctions without balancing the hardships or considering public interest
factors may truly harm the economic well-being of society and provide
less incentive for property owners to protect endangered species. 25
This article will further discuss these issues after having first
examined the cases that have addressed ESA preliminary injunctions
against private and state actors. This article will then demonstrate that
exercising traditional equitable discretion in these cases is not only
appropriate given the federal courts' current and traditional equity
jurisprudence, it is also the best way to appropriately account for all
interests, including those of endangered species.
II. THE ESA, INJUNCTIONS, AND THE ABANDONMENT OF
TRADITIONAL EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES
A. TVA v. Hill is the Leading Case for the Abandonment of
Traditional Equitable Principles under the ESA
TVA pitted a nearly-complete federal dam project against a nearly-
extinct species of fish-there was little question that the completion of the
federal dam project would either eradicate the entire population of snail
darters or at the very least destroy the snail darter species' critical
habitat.26 The issue, however, was whether the ESA was flexible enough
23 See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 669-71
(2007); Amoco Prod. Co., 480 U.S. at 543; Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 312-13.
24 See infra Part III.
25 See infra Part Ill.
26 See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 171-72 (1978). Professor Zygmunt J.B. Plater was the
lead environmental attorney in TVA and has authored several articles on the decision.
See, e.g., Zygmunt J.B. Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter: An Environmental Law
Paradigm and Its Consequences, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 805 (1986); Zygmunt J.B.
Plater, Endangered Species Act Lessons Over 30 Years, and the Legacy of the Snail
Darter, a Small Fish in a Pork Barrel, 34 ENVTL. L. 289 (2004); Zygmunt J.B. Plater,
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to allow the Tennessee Valley Authority's project to proceed despite the
violation of § 7 of the ESA.27
While environmental groups argued that courts of equity are
required to enjoin federal projects under such circumstances, it was not
clear that Congress intended the ESA to divest courts of traditional
equitable flexibility, especially considering that Congress continued to
appropriate money towards the dam project after having learned of the
danger it presented to the snail darter species.28 As Chief Justice Burger
noted in his majority opinion, "[i]t may seem curious to some that the
Tiny Fish Big Battle: 30 Years After TVA and the Snail Darter Clashed, the Case Still
Echoes in Caselaw, Politics, and Popular Culture, TENN. B.J., April 2008, at 14.
Interestingly, soon after the TVA decision was issued, several other populations of snail
darters were discovered throughout the Tennessee River Valley, and the species was
reclassified from endangered to threatened; the designation of the species' critical habitat
was also rescinded. See Final Rule Reclassifying the Snail Darter (Percina tanasi) From
an Endangered Species to a Threatened Species and Rescinding Critical Habitat
Designation, 49 Fed. Reg. 27,510 (July 5, 1984) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
27 At the time of the TVA decision, § 7 required that federal agencies consult with the
Secretary of the Interior in order to "insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out
by them do not jeopardize the continued existence of [an] endangered species and
threatened species or result in the destruction or modification of habitat of such species
which is determined .. . to be critical." 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976), amended by Act of
Nov. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92 Stat. 3752. Although there have been some
revisions to the statutory language of § 7, federal agencies are still required to consult
with either the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries Service
on proposed actions. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006). For more on how § 7's
requirements can impact non-federal actors, see supra note 4.
28 TVA, 437 U.S. at 166; see id. at 192-94. In refusing to enjoin completion of the Tellico
Dam, the district court had held that "[a]t some point in time a federal project becomes so
near completion and so incapable of modification that a court of equity should not apply
a statute enacted long after inception of the project to produce an unreasonable result.
Where there has been an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources by
Congress to a project over a span of almost a decade, the Court should proceed with a
great deal of circumspection." Hill v. TVA, 419 F. Supp. 753, 760 (E.D. Tenn. 1976),
rev'd, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the district court
further held that the ESA "does not operate in such a manner as to halt the completion of
this particular project." Id. at 763. See generally Matthew D. McCubbins & Daniel B.
Rodriguez, Canonical Construction and Statutory Revisionism: The Strange Case of the
Appropriations Canon, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 669 (2005).
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survival of a relatively small number of three-inch fish among all the
countless millions of species extant would require the permanent halting
of a virtually completed dam for which Congress has expended more than
$100 million." 29 The potential to stop such an important project that had
continued to receive funding from Congress and to do so on behalf of one
species was seen as a paradox. 30
Nonetheless, the Court held that a permanent injunction was
required under the circumstances. 3 1 Examining the language of § 7 of the
ESA,32 the Court declared that "[i]t has not been shown ... how TVA can
close the gates of the Tellico Dam without 'carrying out' an action that has
been 'authorized' and 'funded' by a federal agency. Nor can we
understand how such action will 'insure' that the snail darter's habitat is
not disrupted." 33  Accordingly, despite the curiosity and paradoxical
nature of enjoining a major federal project for the survival of "a relatively
small number of three-inch fish," the Court concluded that "the
Endangered Species Act require[d] precisely that result." 34
Not only did Chief Justice Burger suggest that the plain language
of § 7 required that result, he also opined that the intent behind the entire
ESA was clear: "The plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was
to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the
cost." 35  Similarly, "the plain language of the Act, buttressed by its
29 TVA, 437 U.S. at 172.
30 Id. ("The paradox is not minimized by the fact that Congress continued to appropriate
large sums of public money for the project, even after congressional Appropriations
Committees were apprised of its apparent impact upon the survival of the snail darter.").
31 Id. at 172-73.
32 See supra note 27.
3 TVA, 437 U.S. at 173.
34 Id. at 172-73. One case comment contends that "the virtual unanimity of support for
the ESA suggests that Congress did not anticipate subsequent controversies between the
ESA and human endeavors," but that "[t]his congressional failure to anticipate
controversy, however, should not prevent courts from applying the ESA to reach
controversial outcomes." Kevin D. Batt, Comment, Above All, Do No Harm: Sweet
Home and Section Nine of the Endangered Species Act, 75 B.U. L. REv. 1177, 1183 &
n.31 (1995) (footnote call number omitted).
1 TVA, 437 U.S. at 184. Professors William N. Eskridge, Jr., and John Ferejohn have
called Chief Justice Burger's decision in TVA "the greatest statutory opinion of his
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legislative history, shows clearly that Congress viewed the value of
endangered species as 'incalculable."' 36
In response to Justice Powell's dissent that pointed to the
continued Congressional funding of the dam project and urged "a
permissible construction [of the ESA] that accords with some modicum of
common sense and the public weal,"37 Chief Justice Burger offered the
following:
[I]s that our function? We have no expert knowledge on
the subject of endangered species, much less do we have a
mandate from the people to strike a balance of equities on
the side of the Tellico Dam. Congress has spoken in the
plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the
career," with the language on "[t]he plain intent of Congress in enacting" the ESA as the
"most excellent [part of] the Chief's opinion." William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn,
Super-Statutes, 50 DuKE L.J. 1215, 1244 (2001). Eskridge and Ferejohn contend that
"[t]he breadth of the ESA as applied is even more striking in its effect on other federal
laws. If there was any doubt that the statute's bar to federal programs that harmed
endangered species and their habitats needed to be taken seriously, it was laid to rest in
the famous case of TVA v. Hill." Id. But see Damien Schiff, Nothing New Under the
Sun: The Minimalism of ChiefJustice Roberts and the Supreme Court's Recent
Environmental Law Jurisprudence, 15 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 35-37 (2007). In
his article, Schiff discusses the Supreme Court's opinion in National Association of
Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007), in which the Court decided
that mandatory federal actions are not subject to the § 7 consultation requirement, id. at
673, and notes that "environmental groups argued that TVA required federal agencies to
make species and habitat preservation the federal government's foremost goal, and cited
to language in the Court's opinion to that effect. But the majority rejected that broad
reading largely on the grounds that TVA dealt only with a discretionary federal action and
not ... a nondiscretionary federal action." Schiff, supra note 35, at 37.
3 TVA, 437 U.S. at 187. The Court also observed that "[a]s it was finally passed, the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 represented the most comprehensive legislation for the
preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation." Id. at 180.
7 Id. at 196 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell's dissenting opinion was joined by
Justice Blackmun. Id. at 195. For Justice Powell, common sense meant refraining from
enjoining the Tellico Dam project. See id. at 206 ("[A]t some stage of a federal project,
and certainly where a federal project has been completed, the agency no longer has a
reasonable choice simply to abandon it.").
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balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered
species the highest of priorities ... .3
Justice Rehnquist also dissented and argued that the district court
in the TVA litigation acted well within its authority in refusing to enjoin
the completion of the dam.39 Relying on the Court's decision in Hecht
Co. v. Bowles,4 0 he pointed out that district courts are unable to engage in
traditional equitable balancing only in limited circumstances: "'[I]f
Congress desired to make such an abrupt departure from traditional equity
practice as is suggested, it would have made its desire plain."' 41 The
3 8Id. at 194 (majority opinion). This language leads many scholars to argue that TVA
prevents courts from conducting the traditional equitable exercises of balancing the
harms and considering the public interest. See, e.g., STANFORD ENVTL. LAW Soc'y, THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 213-14 (2001) (suggesting that the "highest of priorities"
language means that "[i]n other words, Congress 'foreclosed normal equitable balancing
incident to the issuance of injunctive relief'" (quoting Arthur D. Smith, Programmatic
Consultation Under the Endangered Species Act: An Anatomy of the Salmon Habitat
Litigation, 11 J. ENvTL. L. & LITIG. 247, 317 (1996))); see also Parenteau, supra note 8,
at 334 ("The Court [in TVA] ruled that Congress explicitly removed the federal
judiciary's traditional equitable authority to balance competing interests in deciding
whether to issue injunctions under the ESA. The Court said that the 'language, history,
and structure of the legislation under review here indicates beyond doubt that Congress
intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities."' (footnote call
number omitted)).
" TVA, 437 U.S. at 211 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
40 See id. at 211-13 (citing Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944)).
41 Id. at 212 (alteration in original) (quoting Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 329-30). In
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, the Court held that a district court was not required to
issue an injunction prohibiting Naval operations in light of a violation of the CWA. 456
U.S. 305, 320 (1982) ("[A] major departure from the long tradition of equity practice
should not be lightly implied.... Rather than requiring a district court to issue an
injunction for any and all statutory violations, the [CWA] permits the district court to
order that relief it considers necessary to secure prompt compliance with the Act."). In so
doing, the Court reaffirmed Hecht Co. 's holding that the statutes should be construed "in
favor of that interpretation which affords a full opportunity for equity courts to treat
enforcement proceedings . .. in accordance with their traditional principles, as
conditioned by the necessities of the public interest which Congress has sought to
protect." Id. at 320 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 330).
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majority's decision was, according to Justice Rehnquist, a "sharp[]
retreat[] from the principle of statutory construction announced in Hecht
Co.," and the district court's conclusion that the interest of the snail darter
was "one side of the balance [that] was more than outweighed by equally
42
significant factors" was not an abuse of discretion.
But the majority's decision overturned this balancing and, in so
doing, provided a powerful language that "plac[ed] the goal of 'revers[ing]
the trend toward species extinction' above considerations of cost, and
explicitly precluded courts from engaging in traditional equitable
balancing in determining whether to issue an injunction in the face of a
violation of the Act."43 However, as the analysis below will explain, this
"majestic" language 44 persists not only in the face of violations of the
ESA, but it can also be found in case law involving a significantly
different scenario than was at issue in TVA: preliminary injunctive relief
against non-federal actors.
42 TVA, 437 U.S. at 212-13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). According to Professor Plater,
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion suggests that he "concluded that the [district] court
... had an unlimited ability to override the [Endangered Species Act]." Zygmunt J.B.
Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CAL. L. REV. 524, 554 (1982).
Rather than being concerned with the ability (unlimited or otherwise) to override the
ESA, Justice Rehnquist seems to have been concerned with the absolute duty to ensure
ESA compliance: "I choose to adhere to Hecht Co.'s teaching: '[A] grant ofjurisdiction
to issue compliance orders hardly suggests an absolute duty to do so under any and all
circumstances. We cannot but think that if Congress had intended to make such a drastic
departure from traditions of equity practice, an unequivocal statement of purpose would
have been made."' TVA, 437 U.S. at 212 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (alteration in
original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 329). In any event, as
Professor Cheever notes, Justice Rehnquist's dissent in TVA "has never developed any
significant following among the lower federal courts." Cheever, supra note 6, at 313.
43 Cheever, supra note 6, at 316 (alteration in original) (footnote call number omitted).
"4See PLF Liberty Blog, A Critique of TVA v. Hill, http://plf.typepad.com/plf/2008/06/a-
critique-of-tva-v-hill.html (June 16, 2008, 20:45 PST).
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B. The Ninth Circuit's Foreclosure of Traditional
Equitable Balancing in All ESA Injunctions
i. Sierra Club v. Marsh and the Expansion of TVA in the Federal Context
Nearly ten years after the Supreme Court's decision in TVA, the
Ninth Circuit in Sierra Club v. Marsh issued an injunction against the
Army Corps of Engineers (hereinafter "Corps"), preventing the Corps
from completing a flood control project after questions arose as to a key
assumption underlying the Corps' project.4 5 While the Corps had agreed
to provide mitigation lands for the endangered California least tern and
light-footed clapper rail,46  it encountered unexpected difficulty in
acquiring 188 acres of marsh that the County of San Diego had promised
to provide.47 Despite the unlikelihood that the county would be able to
continue abstaining from compliance with the terms of the agreement it
entered into with the Corps, 4 8 the Ninth Circuit held that
45 See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1389 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that "if an
agency plans to mitigate its project's adverse effects on an endangered species by
acquiring habitat and creating a refuge, it must insure the creation of that refuge before it
permits destruction or adverse modification of other habitat").
46 The Corps entered into this agreement after it was recommended by the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, which concluded that the mitigation measures would "provide the
minimally acceptable loss compensation requirements needed to protect and maintain
wetland habitat and endangered species." Sierra Club, 816 F.2d at 1379 (internal
uotation marks omitted).
4 Id. at 1379-80. Although the County of San Diego "promised to transfer the mitigation
lands within one year in consideration for the [Corps] commencing construction of the
flood control channel," it failed to perform and entered into an escrow agreement that
"reserved seven easements in the mitigation lands, which both the [Corps] and FWS
contend[ed] would reduce or eliminate the land's value as habitat for the endangered
species." Id. at 1380.
48 The Corps argued that it had "no obligation to halt construction until the Sierra Club or
the County establishe[d] that the [Corps] will more likely than not lose its cross claim
against the County." Id. at 1385. The Ninth Circuit was unconvinced, responding that
the Corps' actions "fall far below insuring that the project is not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of the birds." Id. (emphasis omitted).
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the risk that the COE might not prevail must be borne by
the project, not by the endangered species. Similarly, any
delay caused by the County's breach must be of
construction, not of mitigation. Congress clearly intended
that the COE give "the highest of priorities" and the
"benefit of the doubt" to preserving endangered species
such as the tern and the rail.49
Indeed, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the ESA in TVA was
instructive in a broad context: "In Congress's view . . . the balance of
hardships and the public interest tip heavily in favor of endangered
species. We may not use equity's scales to strike a different balance."50
Thus, while the Ninth Circuit was aware that requiring reinitiation of
consultation may "delay the public's enjoyment of the project's benefits
and may significantly increase the costs," the court concluded that
"regardless of any consequences of delay, the ESA requires this result."'
Less than a year later, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Sierra Club's holding
49 Id. at 1386 (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978)).
5 0 Id. at 1383 (citation omitted) (citing TVA, 437 U.S. at 187-88).
51 Id. at 1389. In a footnote, the court suggested that "[e]ven if we had applied the
traditional test for preliminary injunctions, we would hold that the district court clearly
erred in balancing the hardships to the respective parties." Id. n. 13. It is difficult to
understand how ruling in favor of the Corps would be a clear error in balancing the
hardships; the court's subsequent analysis in this footnote appears to be based on TVA 's
standard, not on traditional balancing: "We are aware of the difficult decision that faced
the district court: 'If the court grants the injunction, the combined projects, twenty years
in the planning, come to a grinding halt.' Although we do not denigrate the court's
concern with the expense and inconvenience to the public an injunction would cause,
Congress has decided that these losses cannot equal the potential loss from extinction."
Id. (citing TVA, 437 U.S. at 172-73). The court's injunction was to continue "until the
[Corps] conforms its project to the requirements of section 7(a)(2)" of the ESA. Id.
Major Craig E. Teller later cited Sierra Club in his analysis that "Section 7(a)(2) affords
powerful protection of listed species and their habitats ... and is a major constraint on
[their] actions. It forces installations-in all their activities-to evaluate the direct and
indirect effects of their actions and of other 'interrelated' and 'interdependent' federal,
state, and private actions on the survival and recovery of listed species." Major Craig E.
Teller, Effective Installation Compliance with the Endangered Species Act, 1993 ARMY
LAW. 5, 12 (1993).
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and noted that in enacting the ESA, "Congress removed from the courts
their traditional equitable discretion in injunction proceedings." 52
ii. National Wildlife Federation v. Burlington Northern R.R. and
the Expansion of TVA in the Non-Federal Context
The Ninth Circuit extended the unique ESA injunctive relief
standard to preliminary injunctions of non-federal actors in National
Wildlife Federation v. Burlington Northern R.R.5 3  In Burlington
Northern, a train derailment in northwest Montana led to the spill of a
massive amount of corn on and around Burlington Northern (hereinafter
"BN") rail tracks. 54 This spill attracted grizzly bears (a threatened species
under the ESA) near the tracks, and several bears subsequently had fatal
encounters with BN trains.55
The National Wildlife Federation sued BN and moved for a
preliminary injunction that would require a reduction of BN trains'
operating speed near derailment sites, a feasibility study, and an incidental
56take permit under § 10 of the ESA. BN contended that such an
injunction was unnecessary, as it had already spent nearly ten million
dollars to prevent future derailments.
Citing TVA and Sierra Club, the court held that the
52 Friends of the Earth v. United States, 841 F.2d 927, 933 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief under the National Defense Authorization
Act of 1987, comparing the NDAA to the ESA, and holding that "[a]s in TVA v. Hill, an
examination of the language, history, and structure of the NDAA demonstrates that
Congress intended that no construction [of Naval homeports] should commence prior to
issuance of all required permits"). The Ninth Circuit most recently affirmed Sierra Club
and Friends of the Earth in National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries
Service, 422 F.3d 782, 793-94 (9th Cir. 2005).
5 See 23 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1994).
54 Id. at 1510.
55 Id.
5 6 Id. For more on incidental take permits under the ESA, see infra note 102.
s7 See Burlington N R.R., 23 F.3d at 1510 n.3.
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traditional test for preliminary injunctions .. . is not the test
for injunctions under the Endangered Species Act. In cases
involving the ESA, Congress removed from the courts their
traditional equitable discretion in injunction proceedings of
balancing the parties' competing interests. The 'language,
history, and structure' of the ESA demonstrates Congress'
determination that the balance of hardships and the public
interest tips heavily in favor of protected species.58
The Ninth Circuit most recently affirmed Burlington Northern in
2005, once again opining that "[t]he traditional preliminary injunction
analysis does not apply to injunctions issued pursuant to the ESA."5 9
District courts throughout the Ninth Circuit have applied Burlington
Northern's tipped-scale standard in considering preliminary injunctive
relief against non-federal actors. 60
8 Id. at 1510-11 (citations omitted) (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978);
Friends of the Earth v. U.S. Navy, 841 F.2d 927, 933 (9th Cir. 1988); and Sierra Club v.
Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1383 (9th Cir. 1987)). Despite precluding equitable balancing and
public interest considerations, the court concluded that a preliminary injunction was
unnecessary, as there was "no clear evidence that the BN operations will result in the
deaths of members of a protected species, as in TVA." Burlington N. R.R., 23 F.3d at
1512. In particular, the court noted that "after spending nearly $10,000,000 in cleanup
and rebuilding costs, BN will have as great an incentive as NWF to minimize bear
mortality from its operations, with or without a court order." Id. at 1513.
' Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 422 F.3d 782, 793 (9th Cir.
2005) (citing Burlington N R.R., 23 F.3d at 1510).
60 See, e.g., Seattle Audobon Soc'y v. Sutherland, No. C06-1608MJP, 2007 WL 2220256,
at *14 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 2007); Pac. Rivers Council v. Brown, No. CV 02-243-BR,
2003 WL 21087974, at *2 (D. Or. April 21, 2003). Even before Burlington Northern, the
District of Hawaii had concluded that Hawaii's multiple use policy of protecting
endangered species and at the same encouraging sport hunting on its lands conflicted
with the ESA, which "does not allow a 'balancing' approach for multiple use
considerations." Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1081
(D. Hawaii 1986). Accordingly, Judge King enjoined Hawaii to remove Mouflon sheep
from an endangered bird's (the Palila) habitat: "[T]he presence of mouflon sheep in
numbers sufficient for sport-hunting is harming the Palila. They degrade the mamane
ecosystem to the extent that there is an actual present negative impact on the Palila
population that threatens the continued existence and recovery of the species. Once this
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C. The First Circuit Adopts Burlington Northern's Application of TVA's
Injunctive Relief Standard to ESA Cases Involving Non-Federal Actors
The First Circuit has followed the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Burlington Northern and has abandoned the traditional approach to
preliminary injunctions in ESA cases.61 At the same time, the balance of
hardships and the public interest appears to tip less heavily in favor of
protected species in the First Circuit than it does in the Ninth Circuit. 62
In Strahan v. Coxe,63 the First Circuit considered a district court's
preliminary injunction of Massachusetts' officials under the ESA.64 The
plaintiff in Strahan had sought "a preliminary injunction ordering the
Commonwealth to revoke licenses and permits it had issued authorizing
gillnet and lobster pot fishing and barring the Commonwealth from issuing
such licenses and permits in the future" until it had received incidental
take permits under the ESA.65 Included in the district court's injunction
were orders for the officials to apply for an incidental take permit for
Northern right whales, to prepare a proposal to restrict fixed-fishing gear
in the whales' critical habitat off the Massachusetts coast, and to establish
a Whale Working Group in order to enpage in substantive discussions
with the environmental plaintiff, Strahan.6
The Massachusetts' officials appealed the issuance of these orders,
and, in particular, sought to avoid any dialogue with Strahan, as this would
result in irreparable harm to Massachusetts given "the contentious
relationship between the parties." 67 The First Circuit responded:
determination has been made, the Endangered Species Act leaves no room for balancing
policy considerations, but rather requires me to order the removal of mouflon sheep from
Mauna Kea." Id. at 1082.
61 See, e.g., Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997).
62 See infra Part I.C.
61 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997).
SId.
6 1d at 158.
SId.
6 1Id. at 171.
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Although it is generally true in the preliminary injunction
context that the district court is required to weigh and
balance the relative harms to the non-movant if the
injunction is granted and to the movant if it is not, in the
context of ESA litigation, that balance has been answered
by Congress' determination that the "balance of hardships
and the public interest tips heavily in favor of protected
species." 68
Accordingly, the fact that forced dialogue between Strahan and the
Massachusetts' officials created an "unwanted relationship" was of little
concern to the First Circuit, and the district court's preliminary injunction
orders under the ESA were upheld.69
68 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N. R.R., 23 F.3d
1508, 1510 (9th Cir. 1994)). A later court decision indicates that Massachusetts was
within reason to be concerned over being required to engage in dialogue with Strahan.
See Strahan v. Pritchard, 473 F. Supp. 2d 230, 234-35 (D. Mass. 2007) ("[T]he plaintiff
appears pro se perhaps to the detriment of his own cause. While Strahan demonstrates an
admirable facility with the law and a true passion for whale conservation, his lack of
formal legal training and sometimes abrupt courtroom demeanor have handicapped the
prosecution of his claims. Although the Court has repeatedly advised him that he would
be well-served to retain counsel, he has declined to do so but is, nevertheless, entitled to
his day in court. The Court has done its best to accommodate the plaintiff s presentation
and to evaluate the evidence that has been presented in a haphazard manner.").
69 See Coxe, 127 F.3d at 170-71. For an interesting analysis of the First Circuit's decision
in Strahan, see Jonathan Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future ofFederal
Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REv. 377, 428-34 (2005). Professor Adler
critiqued the First Circuit's implicit holding that "states have an obligation to administer
state regulatory programs so as to implement the federal ESA, even though the activities
to be regulated are themselves already illegal under federal law." Id. at 429. According
to Adler, "[t]his seems to contravene the holding of [New York v. United States] that 'even
where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or
prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or
prohibit those acts."' Id. (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992)).
Professor Adler further suggested that "[i]t is not clear upon what basis the legal
obligation to enforce [the ESA's take] prohibition can be transposed onto a state merely
because it elects to adopt a licensing scheme for state waters" and notes that "[i]f the state
refrained from regulating gillnet and lobsterpot fishing altogether, the only way to
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The First Circuit later clarified its ESA preliminary injunctive
relief standard in Water Keeper Alliance v. United States Department of
Defense.70  The injunction sought by the plaintiffs in Water Keeper
Alliance would have stayed military exercises near a Puerto Rican
island.7' The First Circuit noted that, although the circumstances in Coxe
and Burlington Northern required that the endangered species be given
"the utmost consideration, we do not think that they can blindly compel
our decision in this case because the harm asserted by the Navy implicates
national security and therefore deserves greater weight than the economic
harm" in Coxe and Burlington Northern.72 Likewise, "[t]he effect of a
preliminary injunction on the public interest is directly tied to its impact
on both military preparedness and the endangered and threatened species,"
so that "the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the
public interest weighed in favor of denying a preliminary injunction."73
Although Water Keeper Alliance concerned a federal actor, district
courts in the First Circuit post-Water Keeper Alliance have refused to
abstain from any balancing or public interest considerations for non-
federal actors, notwithstanding Coxe's declining to consider the interest of
the non-movant. For instance, in Strahan v. Pritchard,74 the District Court
of Massachusetts stated that "[a] thorough analysis of the effect of the
requested relief on the public interest . . . is neither warranted nor
appropriate. " However, the court refused to grant the "extraordinarily
broad relief' sought by the plaintiff,76 due to the "obvious detrimental
mandate state enforcement of an anti-take prohibition would be to commandeer state
officials." Id.
70 271 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2001).
71 Id. at 24.
7 2 Id. at 34 (citing Coxe, 127 F.3d at 171 and Burlington N. R.R., 23 F.3d at 1510).
7 Id. at 35.
74 473 F. Supp. 2d 230 (D. Mass. 2007).
7s Id. at 240
7 In order to effectively protect numerous species of endangered whales, the plaintiffs in
Pritchard requested, in part, that the court enjoin Massachusetts officials "from all further
licensing of fixed fishing gear and require all persons currently using fixed fishing gear to
immediately remove such gear from coastal waters." Id. Although fixed fishing gear
was known to lead to the entanglement of whales, the court declined adopt the plaintiffs
suggestion due to a preventive regulation requiring sinking line in state waters, as
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impact that such an order would have on the Massachusetts fishing
industry" and because "the requested injunction would be devastating to
the livelihood of fishermen and to the survival of their communities."7 7
Accordingly, the court issued orders that "ensure[d] the temporary
monitoring of the threat posed to endangered whales by fixed fishing gear
without unduly disrupting the commercial fishing industry."
Similarly, the District of Maine has opined that, although "'the
balance of hardships and the public interest tips heavily in favor of
protected species,"' "the advantage given to the endangered species is not
necessarily dispositive, and . . . the presumption is rebuttable." 79 Since
some courts have not entirely "excluded consideration of the hardship to
"entanglements will become less frequent after the imposition of the new regulation.
Because injunctive relief may be granted only upon a showing that the alleged activity
will 'actually' (as opposed to 'potentially') cause harm to endangered animals, an
injunction at this time is not warranted." Id. at 239 (citing Am. Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9
F.3d 163, 166 (1st Cir. 1993)). The Supreme Court has recently confirmed that the mere
possibility of harm is insufficient to satisfy the irreparable harm inquiry of injunctive
relief. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 375-76 (2008) ("Issuing
a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent
with our characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be
awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief." (citing Mazurek
v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam))).
7 7 Pritchard, 473 F. Supp. at 240.
78 Id. at 241. For further indication that the District of Massachusetts uses a slightly less-
tipped scale for ESA preliminary injunctive relief than courts in the Ninth Circuit, see
Strahan v. Holmes, 595 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D. Mass. 2009). Although the plaintiff in
Holmes sought a permanent injunction of a commercial lobster fisherman, the court's
analysis illustrates that the District of Massachusetts will factor harm to the defendant
and the public in any injunctive relief case, preliminary or permanent: "[N]otwithstanding
the fact that under the ESA the 'balance of hardships . . . tips heavily in favor of protected
species,' Strahan has failed to satisfy the third requirement for a permanent injunction.
The hardship that would be imposed upon Holmes by an injunction, i.e. being prevented
from pursuing his livelihood, far outweighs the relatively remote possibility of harm
resulting from any future entanglements of whales in his fishing gear." Id. at 165-66
(alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N.
R.R., 23 F.3d 1508, 1511 (9th Cir. 1994)).
7 9 Animal Prot. Inst. v. Martin, 511 F. Supp. 2d 196, 197-98 (D. Me. 2007) (quoting
Stahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 171 (1st Cir. 1997)).
339
RESTORING TRADITION
defendants or the effect of the impact on the public interest,"80 the court in
Animal Protection Institute v. Martin declined to conclude that "the
impact of an injunction on economic and other interests is inadmissible as
a matter of law."8'
D. District Courts Do Not Apply a Uniform Standard for Preliminary
Injunctive Relief ofNon-Federal Actors under the ESA
Aside from the First and Ninth Circuits, no other circuits have
specifically addressed the standard for preliminary injunctions against
non-federal actors under the ESA. However, two district court decisions
with opposite conclusions on this issue are worth mentionin. 82
The first is Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council,8 in which the
Middle District of Florida was asked to preliminarily enjoin the
enforcement of a county and beachfront illumination ordinance as well as
to enjoin Volusia County from permitting vehicles on its beaches at night,
in order to protect Loggerhead sea turtles and Green sea turtles. 84 The
county argued that the court should consider "the devastating effect" an
injunction would have on the county.8 5  The court declined to do so,
holding that the "balancing of affected 'economic and social enterprises"'
80 Id. at 199 (citing Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1132
(D. Ala. 2006); Am. Rivers v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 271 F. Supp. 2d 230, 249
(D.D.C. 2003); and Hamilton v. City of Austin, 8 F. Supp. 2d 886, 894 n.14 (W.D. Tex.
1998)).
81 Id. Two years after ruling in Animal Protection Institute, Judge Woodcock declined to
address the issue of Winter's effect on TVA's balancing standard in similar litigation. See
Animal Welfare Inst. v. Martin, 668 F. Supp. 2d 254, 273 n. 18 (D. Me. 2009).
82 On the desirability of uniform standards for preliminary injunctions, see Hon. Morton
Denlow, The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction: Time for a Unform Federal Standard,
22 REv. LITIG. 495, 532-33 (2003) ("It is difficult for attorneys to counsel their clients
and predict the way a judge may rule when the legal principles on which the court must
base its discretion are unclear, ambiguous, and rife with contradiction. The most the
attorney can predict is that the judge will apply the principles of the circuit in which the
case is pending.").
83 896 F. Supp. 1170 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
8Id. at 1172.8 1Id. at 1178.
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was appropriate in the context of an incidental take permit, but not for a
court:
If Congress had wanted the federal courts to undertake a
similar balancing of interests, it could have enacted such
legislation. Such language is notably absent from the
Endangered Species Act, and this absence gains increased
significance from the fact that Congress has first-hand
knowledge of the severe economic and social consequences
which may be incurred as a result of this lack of
balancing. 86
Given this analysis, the burden on plaintiffs seeking a preliminary
injunction was minimal, requiring only a showing "(1) that the wildlife at
issue is protected under the Endangered Species Act, and (2) that there is a
reasonable likelihood that the defendant will commit future violations of
the Endangered Species Act." 87  While it was undisputed that the sea
turtles at issue in Loggerhead Turtle were protected under the ESA, the
plaintiffs could only show that the county's permitting of vehicles on the
" Id. at 1179 (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978)). In a recent ESA case
involving a non-federal actor, the District of Maryland cited TVA in enjoining
construction of wind turbines due to threats to the endangered Indiana bat. See Animal
Welfare Inst. v. Beech Ridge Energy, L.L.C., 675 F. Supp. 2d 540, 561 (D. Md. 2009).
The court in Beech Ridge Energy made a passing reference to the ability to balance the
hardships. See id. at 581 ("Congress, in enacting the ESA, has unequivocally stated that
endangered species must be afforded the highest priority, and the FWS long ago
designated the Indiana bat as an endangered species. By the same token, Congress has
strongly encouraged the development of clean, renewable energy, including wind energy.
... The two vital federal policies at issue in this case are not necessarily in conflict.)."
However, the court felt it was necessary to protect against potential harm to the
individual bats, neglecting to consider whether the alleged future ESA violations posed a
population-level threat on the species. See Posting of Brandon Middleton to PLF Liberty
Blog, The Two Big Problems with the Indiana Bat Decision,
http://plf.typepad.com/plf/2009/12/the-two-big-problems-with-the-indiana-bat-
decision.html (Dec. 23, 2009, 13:46 PST).
" Loggerhead Turtle, 896 F. Supp. at 1180 (citing Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N.
R.R., 23 F.3d 1508, 1510-11 (9th Cir. 1994)).
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beach might result in takes of the species, leaving the lighting ordinance
free from an injunction.
In Hamilton v. City of Austin,89 the Western District of Texas was
much more receptive to public interest considerations. The plaintiffs in
City of Austin sought to preliminarily enjoin the cleaning of Barton
Springs Pool in order to protect an endangered species of salamander. 90
Due to its reliance on natural spring water, the pool was susceptible to the
build-up of silt and algae. 91 When city officials sought to clean up the silt
and algae for the protection of swimmers, the plaintiffs claimed that the
stress of the clean-up process would be too much for the endangered
salamander to handle. 92
Notably, the court refused to follow the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Sierra Club and abandoned traditional equitable principles. 93 Further, not
only did the plaintiffs fail to show a substantial likelihood of success on
the merits or any evidence of irreparable harm, the court found that "the
" Id. at 1180-83. Loggerhead Turtle is also noteworthy for its holding that "[a] species
protected under the Endangered Species Act has standing to sue 'in its own right' to
enforce the provisions of the Act." Id. at 1177 (quoting Marbled Murrelet v. Pac.
Lumber Co., 880 F. Supp. 1343, 1346 (N.D. Cal. 1995)); see also Katherine A. Burke,
Can We Stand for It? Amending the Endangered Species Act with An Animal-Suit
Provision, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 633, 638 (2004) ("An animal-suit provision in the ESA
would be consistent with both the legislative intent and the regulatory focus of the
[Endangered Species] Act . . . ."). But see Matthew Armstrong, Cetacean Community v.
Bush: The False Hope ofAnimal Rights Lingers On, 12 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 185, 196 (2006) ("[D]oes Congress have the legislative authority to bestow a
cause of action on animals? . . . Considering recent Supreme Court limitations on
Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause, it is unlikely that Congress could justify
an animal-suit statute."). See generally Joanna B. Wymyslo, Standing for Endangered
Species: Justiciability Beyond Humanity, 15 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 45, 47 (2007) (noting
that "animals have been granted standing in multiple [ESA cases] in the past, albeit
inconsistently" and arguing that "the express congressional authorization of animal
standing under the ESA may be more of a clarification of the ambiguities contained in the
citizen suit provision rather than a radical leap into new jurisdictional territories").
8 8 F. Supp. 2d 886 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
9Id. at 889.
Id. at 891.
92 Id. at 891-92.
9 Id. at 894.
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harm to the defendants and the public interest also weigh heavily against
granting the injunction. . . . It would be quite a tragedy if a swimmer
drowned or was injured because the pool could not be cleaned due to the
'stress' caused to Salamanders by moving them during cleaning." 94
1II. THE LIMITS OF TVA AND WHY ITS INJUNCTIVE RELIEF STANDARD IS
INAPPLICABLE TO ESA CASES INVOLVING NON-FEDERAL ACTORS
A. The Case for a Narrow Reading of TVA in the
Context of Non-Federal Actors
As the foregoing demonstrates, the lower courts' abandonment of
traditional equitable principles when considering preliminary injunctive
relief against non-federal actors stems from the Ninth Circuit's holding
that "the balance of hardships and the public interest tips heavily in favor
of protected species." 95  This holding, in turn, 'is based on TVA's
admonition that endangered species are to be afforded "the highest of
priorities." 96
The point of TVA, however, was not to establish the ESA as a
super-statute that triumphs over traditional notions of equity in each and
every circumstance. 97  Instead, TVA served to put federal agencies on
94 Id. at 894-97. At the beginning of his memorandum opinion and order, Judge Sparks
poetically opined his displeasure that a suit had been brought to cease the cleaning of
Barton Springs, "a true Austin shrine, A hundred years of swimming sublime ....
[T]oday, Austin's citizens get away with a rhyme; But, the truth is, they might not be so
lucky the next time. The Endangered Species Act in its extreme makes no sense. Only
Congress can change it to make this problem past tense." Id. at 888.
9 Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N. R.R., 23 F.3d 1508, 1511 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978)).
96 See id. (citing TVA, 437 U.S. at 174 ("[T]he language, history, and structure of the
legislation under review here indicates beyond doubt that Congress intended endangered
species to be afforded the highest of priorities.")); see also John Earl Duke, Note, Giving
Species the Benefit of the Doubt, 83 B.U. L. REv. 209, 249 (2003) ("[C]ourts
unhesitatingly follow the dictum of TVA v. Hill ... ."). See generally Cheever, supra
note 6, at 315-19.
9 TVA's introductory paragraph makes it clear that the Court was concerned with the
unique circumstances of the case - that "the operation of a virtually completed federal
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notice of its special obligations under § 7 of the ESA. 98 After all, the
injunction issued in TVA was based on the "irreconcilable conflict between
operation of the Tellico Dam and the explicit provisions of § 7."99 Indeed,
much of the Court's analysis was based on the plain language of § 7,
rather than on the ESA as a whole. 00
While it is true that Chief Justice Burger wrote that "the balance
has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of
priorities," this prioritization was meant to address the unique legal issue
of TVA: "[W]hether the Endangered Species Act of 1973 requires a court
to enjoin the operation of a virtually completed federal dam . .. [which]
would eradicate an endangered species."' 0
dam ... would eradicate an endangered species." TVA, 437 U.S. at 156; see also id at
172 ("[T]wo questions are presented: (a) Would TVA be in violation of the [ESA] if it
completed and operated the Tellico Dam as planned? (b) If TVA's actions would offend
the Act, is an injunction the appropriate remedy for the violation?"). See generally Brief
Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioners at 6, Winter v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008) (No. 07-1239), 2008 WL 3851620.
98 See TVA, 437 U.S. at 193-94.
99 Id. at 193.
100 See id. at 172 ("One would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision whose terms
were any plainer than those in § 7 of the Endangered Species Act."); id. at 185 (noting
that "the legislative history undergirding § 7 reveals an explicit congressional decision to
require agencies to afford first priority to the declared national policy of saving
endangered species" as well as "a conscious decision by Congress to give endangered
species priority over the 'primary missions' of federal agencies"); see also Cannon, supra
note 13, at 417 ("The Court's analysis is tightly focused on ascribing congressional intent
in establishing the priority for species in Section 7.").
'0 TVA, 437 U.S. at 156, 194. One interesting aspect of TVA is Justice Stevens' decision
to join the majority opinion. See Kenneth A. Manaster, Justice Stevens, Judicial Power,
and the Varieties ofEnvironmental Litigation, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1963, 1989-92
(2006). One week after the decision was issued, Stevens wrote "I am inclined to think. .
. that the kind of policy choices that are inevitably involved can usually be handled more
effectively by a legislative, executive, or administrative body. A central point of the
Chief Justice's fine opinion in the snail darter case was that the underlying issue was not
one that we should decide." Id. at 1991 (quoting Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to
Kenneth A. Manaster (June 23, 1978) (on file with Professor Manaster)). Given Justice
Stevens' preference for legislative, executive, and administrative bodies to make difficult
environmental policy decisions, it seems odd that he had little trouble with enjoining
TVA's attempt to complete Tellico Dam; given the decision to enjoin the dam project, it
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Although the decision is filled with majestic language, little was
said as to how courts should balance the equities when faced with a non-
federal defendant.102 If this decision was meant to divest federal courts of
traditional equity jurisdiction in each and every circumstance, one would
expect this result to be based on more than just dicta.
B. Back to Basics: The Supreme Court Has Limited the Scope of TVA
and Emphasized the Importance of Traditional Equitable Principles
The Supreme Court confirmed this narrow reading of TVA in 2007.
In NAHB v. Defenders of Wildlife, 03 the Court considered whether the
Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter "EPA") could avoid § 7
consultation when it transferred authority over discharges into the nation's
waters pursuant to the Clean Water Act (hereinafter "CWA").104
Environmentalists argued that simply because the EPA was authorized by
statutory criteria to conduct transfers, this did not exempt the EPA from
consultations with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service on whether a
transfer would jeopardize an endangered species. 0 5
seems likewise odd that Justice Stevens believed that the Court was not deciding the
underlying issue. Cf TVA, 437 U.S. at 172 ("It may seem curious to some that the
survival of a relatively small number of three-inch fish among all the countless millions
of species extant would require the permanent halting of a virtually completed dam for
which Congress has expended more than $100 million. The paradox is not minimized by
the fact that Congress continued to appropriate large sums of public money for the
project, even after congressional Appropriations Committees were apprised of its
apparent impact upon the survival of the snail darter.").2 The ESA distinguishes federal from non-federal actors. See Animal Welfare Inst. v.
Martin, 588 F. Supp. 2d 70, 95 (D. Me. 2008) (discussing 1982 amendments to ESA that
"allow non-federal actors to apply for a permit to engage in the otherwise prohibited
taking of protected species under limited circumstances"). For more on § 10(a)(1)(B)
incidental take permits for non-federal entities, see STANFORD ENvTL. LAW SOC'Y, supra
note 38, at 130-31 and 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2006).
103 551 U.S. 644 (2007).
i0 Id. at 649. For more on § 7 of the ESA, see supra note 4. For an overview of the
NAHB decision, see Malori Dahmen, Note, CWA and the ESA: Nine is a Party, Ten is a
Crowd, 29 ENERGY L.J. 703 (2008).
105 See NAHB, 551 U.S. at 655.
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Under the broad reading of TVA, consultation would seem to have
been required given the instruction "to halt and reverse the trend toward
species extinction, whatever the cost."' 06 As the Ninth Circuit noted in
holding that § 7 consultation was required, TVA's "analysis of the
legislative history of the ESA confirms that the authority conferred on
agencies [by § 7] to protect listed species goes beyond that conferred by
agencies' own governing statutes," such as the CWA's governance of the
EPA.'07
The Supreme Court, however, was not convinced and reversed the
Ninth Circuit in holding that non-discretionary actions like the EPA's
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System were not subject to § 7
consultations. 08 With respect to TVA, its holding that § 7 "contained 'no
exemptions' and reflected 'a conscious decision by Congress to give
endangered species priority over the 'primary missions' of federal
agencies"' offered "no occasion to answer the question presented" in
106 See TVA, 437 U.S. at 184.
107 Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 420 F.3d 946, 964-65 (2005). Central to this article's
argument that TVA 's injunctive relief standard is inapplicable in cases where the
defendant is a non-federal actor is that TVA concerned only § 7 of the ESA, which does
not apply to non-federal actors. Even before the Supreme Court reexamined § 7 in
NAHB, scholars had argued that TVA 's impact on § 7 itself was limited. See, e.g., Steven
G. Davison, Comment, Federal Agency Action Subject to Section 7(A)(2) of the
Endangered Species Act, 14 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 29, 48 (2006) (noting that TVA
only addressed "the issue of whether appropriations for the Tellico Dam after the
enactment of [S]ection 7 amended or partially repealed that section of the ESA"). One
other scholar also correctly noted that the Ninth Circuit's Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA
decision had improperly expanded the scope of § 7. See Mary Beth Hubner, Note,
Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA: Reconciling the Endangered Species Act and Clean Water
Act or Further Confusing the Statutory Overlap?, 17 VILL. ENVTL. L. J. 433, 451 (2006)
("The Ninth Circuit's holding that EPA must engage in ESA [S]ection 7 endangered
species consultation when assessing state permitting applications is inconsistent with the
EPA's statutory duty under the plain language of the CWA and the CWA's explicit
purpose.").
NAHB, 551 U.S. at 673 ("Since the transfer of NPDES permitting authority is not
discretionary, but rather is mandated once a State has met the criteria set forth in § 402(b)
of the CWA, it follows that a transfer of NPDES permitting authority does not trigger §
7(a)(2)'s consultation and no-jeopardy requirements.").
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NAHB.109 "TVA v. Hill thus supports the position ... that the ESA's no-
jeopardy mandate applies to every discretionary agency action-regardless
of the expense or burden its application might impose. But that case did
not speak to the question of whether § 7(a)(2) applies to non-discretionary
actions, like the one at issue here.""10 This analysis suggests that the
instruction "to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction,
whatever the cost""' was not to be taken globally, but instead was
specific only to the unique legal circumstances presented in TVA.112
Although Justice Stevens dissented and concluded that the EPA
was not exempt from § 7 consultation, he seemed to similarly indicate that
the special balancing established in TVA was applicable only to federal
actors.113  As he wrote, TVA "explained at length why § 7 imposed
obligations on 'all federal agencies' to ensure that 'actions authorized,
109 Id. at 670 (citing TVA, 437 U.S. at 173, 185, 188).
110 Id. at 671 (emphasis omitted).
. TVA, 437 U.S. at 184.
112 One scholar notes the Court in NAHB dismissed the relevance of TVA. See Katherine
Mapes, Comment, National Association of Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 32
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 263, 269 (2008). If TVA was not relevant to the Court's decision
in NAHB, both of which concern the application of § 7, it is difficult to understand why
TVA should be applicable to ESA cases that do not concern § 7. See Sam Coleman, Note,
Constraining the Extent ofSection 7 of the Endangered Species Act: National Association
of Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 12 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 86, 102
(2007) (noting that the majority in NAHB "cabined the bold and sweeping language of
TVA v. Hill" and that "TVA v. Hill never considered whether section 7 applied to non-
discretionary federal agency actions"). Some commentators argue that Justice Alito's
majority opinion in NAHB ignored TVA. See, e.g., Lynn Doiron, Note, National Ass'n of
Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife: The Supreme Court Narrows the Scope of the
ESA, 21 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 111, 119 (2007) ("The Court did not overturn TVA; in fact, the
Court tried to ignore it completely."); Joe Schlotzhauer, Note, An Uncivil Action: The
Supreme Court Dilutes the Endangered Species Act, 15 Mo. ENVTL. L & POL'Y REV.
415, 432 (2008) ("While the Supreme Court had previously held in [TVA v. Hill] that
'endangered species are supposed to take priority over the "primary missions" of federal
agencies,' the [NAHB] majority ignored this imperative."). On the contrary, rather than
ignore TVA, the majority in NAHB explained quite clearly why TVA was inapplicable.
Moreover, such analyses are based on the assumption that TVA's "highest of priorities"
language is applicable in each and every circumstance under the ESA; NAHB indicates
this assumption is misguided.
1 See NAHB, 551 U.S. at 674-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence
of endangered species.""' 4  The messages of TVA were that "Congress
intended the ESA to apply to 'all federal agencies' and to all 'actions
authorized, funded, or carried out by them"' and that "the ESA has 'first
priority' over all other federal action."' 15
To be clear, courts that foreclose traditional equitable analysis in
ESA cases against non-federal actors cite TVA's declaration that "the
language, history, and structure" of the ESA indicate that "Congress
intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities,"
opining that that message is broadly applicable to every ESA-related issue,
not just what was before the Court in TVA.116 If this were so, the question
presented in NAHB should have been an easy one, and the Court should
have required the EPA to engage in § 7 consultation in order to afford
endangered species "the highest of priorities."" 7 Yet this did not happen,
and only Justice Breyer pointed to this language in the dissent."1
114 Id. at 675 (quoting TVA, 437 U.S. at 173).
"' Id. (citing TVA, 437 U.S. at 173, 185) (emphasis added); see also Coleman, supra note
112, at 104 ("To the extent that TVA v. Hill correctly interpreted section 7 of the ESA as a
singular, far-reaching mandate for federal agencies, Justice Stevens' dissent in [NAHB]
more faithfully upholds the intent of Congress.").
116 See, e.g., Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N. R.R., 23 F.3d 1508, 1511 (9th Cir.
1994) ("In cases involving the ESA, Congress removed from the courts their traditional
equitable discretion in injunction proceedings of balancing the parties' competing
interests. The 'language, history, and structure' of the ESA demonstrates Congress'
determination that the balance of hardships and the public interest tips heavily in favor of
protected species." (quoting TVA, 437 U.S. at 174)).
" See TVA, 437 U.S. at 174; cf Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 420 F.3d 946, 964-65
(9th Cir. 2005), rev'd, NAHB v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 664 (2007).
118 See NAHB, 551 U.S. at 699 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[W]e have held that the
Endangered Species Act changed the regulatory landscape, 'indicat[ing] beyond doubt
that Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities."'
(alteration in original) (quoting TVA, 437 U.S. at 174)). While the Court in Babbitt v.
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon referred to TVA's instruction
that the intent behind the ESA "was to halt and reverse the trend towards species
extinction, whatever the cost," it was careful to point out that the ESA's purpose was
relevant only in the context of the respondents' facial claim that the Interior Secretary's
"harm" regulation was not reasonable. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for
a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 699-700 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
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Just as the Court has emphasized the narrow circumstances of
TVA, so too has it reminded lower courts that they should not depart from
traditional principles of equity without clear direction from Congress." 9
This rule is applicable in most instances of equity jurisdiction,1 including
environmental cases, and adds further support to the notion that courts
considering ESA preliminary injunctive relief against non-federal actors
should engage in the traditional balancing of the equities and consideration
of the public interest. 121
TVA, 437 U.S. at 184). As the Court indicated, "Respondents advance[d] strong
arguments that activities that cause minimal or unforeseeable harm will not violate the
Act as construed in the 'harm' regulation," but they "presented a facial challenge to the
regulation." Id. at 699. "Thus, they ask us to invalidate the Secretary's understanding of
'harm' in every circumstance, even when an actor knows that an activity, such as
draining a pond, would actually result in the extinction of a listed species by destroying
its habitat. Given Congress' clear expression of the ESA's broad purpose to protect
endangered and threatened wildlife, the Secretary's definition of 'harm' is reasonable."
Id. at 699-700. Conversely, in the context of preliminary injunctive relief of non-federal
actors, although there is no doubt from reading TVA that "the ESA's broad purpose [is] to
protect endangered and threatened wildlife," the Court has never indicated that this
purpose should trump all other considerations in each and every circumstance. See id.
119 See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 376-77 ("A preliminary
injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right. In each case, courts
'must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party
of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.' 'In exercising their sound
discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public consequences in
employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction."' (citation omitted) (quoting Amoco
Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987) and Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982))).
12 0 See Grupo Mexicano de DeSarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 322 (1999)
("We do not question the proposition that equity is flexible; but in the federal system, at
least, that flexibility is confined within the broad boundaries of traditional equitable
relief.").
121 For more on preliminary injunctive relief and its rationale, see John Leubsdorf, The
Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REv. 525 (1978) and John




In Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gamble, 2 2 for instance, the
Court noted "the well-established principles governing the award of
equitable relief in federal courts."' 2 3 Included within these principles was
that
a court must balance the competing claims of injury and
must consider the effect on each party of the granting or
withholding of the requested relief. Although particular
regard should be given to the public interest, "[t]he grant of
jurisdiction to ensure compliance with a statute hardly
suggests an absolute duty to do so under any and all
circumstances . . . . [W]e do not lightly assume that
Congress has intended to depart from established
principles .... 'Unless a statute in so many words, or by a
necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court's
jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to
be recognized and applied."'l
24
The statutes that have restricted federal courts' equity jurisdiction
are clear on this point. For example, the Court in Weinberger v. Romero-
Barcelol25 pointed out the difference between the CWA's general grant of
122 480 U.S. 531 (1987) (holding that courts must engage in a traditional equitable
analysis when considering a preliminary injunction under the Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3210(a) (2006)).
123 Id. at 542 (citing Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 311-13).
124 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 313). In a footnote,
the Ninth Circuit had cited TVA for the assertion that "only the issuance of a preliminary
injunction to compel compliance with the requirements of section 810 [of the ANILCA]
can uphold Congressional intent." People of Village of Gambell v. Hodel, 774 F.2d
1414, 1426 n.2 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd in part, vacated in part, Amoco Prod. Co., 480 U.S.
531 (citing TVA, 437 U.S. at 194). The Supreme Court, however, ruled that such an
expansive interpretation of TVA was erroneous and noted that the injunction in TVA was
issued "in order to preserve the snail darter . .. and it was conceded that completion of
the dam would destroy the critical habitat of the snail darter." Amoco Prod Co., 480
U.S. at 543 n.9.
125 456 U.S. 305 (1982) (holding that the Clean Water Act does not foreclose the
exercise of equitable discretion). Just as in Amoco Production Co., the Court in
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authority to federal courts to hear civil actions seeking injunctive relief
and the CWA's "rule of immediate cessation" that directs the EPA
director to "seek an injunction to restrain immediately discharges of
pollutants he finds to be presenting 'an imminent and substantial
endangerment to the health of persons or to the welfare of persons."'l26
No such provision exists within the ESA, however. The arguments
in favor of abandoning traditional equitable relief are instead based on
TVA, which, as noted above, dealt with narrow factual and legal issues.127
Without an explicit provision mandating the restriction of federal courts'
traditional equity jurisdiction, courts considering preliminary injunctive
relief under the ESA must abide by the general rule as stated in Winter,
that
[i]n each case, courts "must balance the competing claims
of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the
granting or withholding of the requested relief." "In
exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should
pay particular regard for the public consequences in
employing the extraordinary remedy of injunctive
relief." 128
Romero-Barcelo limited TVA to the facts of that case. See Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at
314 ("It was conceded in Hill that completion of the dam would eliminate an endangered
species by destroying its critical habitat."); see also Cannon, supra note 13, at 418 ("The
Court's opinion [in TVA] might be read to suggest that injunctive relief is mandatory in
any action to enforce a regulatory prohibition of the sort present in most environmental
statutes. In Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, however ... the Court made clear that this
was not what it meant.... [T]he Court [in Romero-Barcelo] reasserted its capacity-and
will-not only to identify outcomes giving questionable priority to environmental
concerns, as it had done in TVA, but to avoid them through the exercise of judicial good
sense ... ." (footnote call number omitted)).
126 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 317 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a) (Supp. IV 1976)).
127 See supra Part III.A.
128 Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 376-77 (2008) (quoting
Amoco Prod Co., 480 U.S. at 542 and Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 312); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, Court Sets Higher Hurdle for Preliminary Injunctions, TRIAL, Jan. 2009, at
58, 59 ("[T]his strict approach to preliminary injunctions could apply in all cases where
plaintiffs seek this type of equitable relief. Defendants in federal court may start calling
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Moreover, the balance of equities and consideration of public interest "are
pertinent in assessing the propriety of any injunctive relief, preliminary or
permanent."l29 Winter confirms that federal courts should be "quite
hesitant to tip the scales of equity automatically in favor of one party or
another," including in instances where preliminary injunctive relief of a
non-federal actor is being considered.130
Although Burlington Northern and its progeny hold otherwise,
TVA is silent, or at the very least ambiguous, as to whether its analysis and
emphasis on protecting endangered species "whatever the cost" are
applicable to non-federal actors.'31 Until there is further direction either
from Congress or the Supreme Court itself on ESA preliminary injunctive
relief against non-federal actors, courts should narrowly interpret TVA by
upon [Winter], even in matters having nothing to do with sonar testing, whales, or
environmental law.").
129 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 381 (emphasis added).
130 PLF Liberty Blog, Supreme Court to Lower Courts: Environmental Interests are not
the Only Ones to Consider, supra note 20; see AM. BAR Ass'N, ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY,
AND RESOURCES LAW: THE YEAR IN REVIEW 56 (2008) (noting that Winter "undoubtedly
will affect the ESA preliminary injunction doctrine").
131 Notably, the Eastern District of California has recently held that TVA does not
foreclose the traditional balancing of hardships in all circumstances, even in cases
involving federal actors. In The Consolidated Salmonid Cases and The Consolidated
Delta Smelt Cases, urban and agricultural water users sought to preliminarily enjoin the
federal government's ESA water delivery restrictions that had been issued for the
purported benefit of several fish species. The court held in favor of the water users,
based in part on the effect the water cutbacks had on basic human welfare, including the
destruction of permanent crops, fallowed lands, destruction of family and entity farm
businesses, and social disruption and dislocation, such as increased property crimes and
intra-family crimes of violence, and increased unemployment leading to hunger and
homelessness. The court, however, also noted that injunctive relief could not be issued if
such relief would jeopardize listed species. See The Consolidated Salmonid Cases, No.
1:09-cv-01053-OWW-DLB, slip op. at 126-27 (E.D. Cal. May 18, 2010) ("No case,
including TVA v. Hill, which concerned the competing economic interest in the operation
of a hydro-electric project, expressly addresses whether the ESA precludes the balancing
of harms to humans and the human environment under the circumstances presented here.
. . .Congress has not nor does TVA v. Hill elevate species protection over the health and
human safety of humans."); The Consolidated Delta Smelt Cases, No. 1:09-cv-00407-
OWW-DLB, slip op. at 118-19 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 2010) (same).
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conducting the traditional balancing of harms and consideration of the
public interest.
C. Applying the Traditional Injunctive Relief Standards to Non-Federal
Actors under the ESA: Better for Property Owners, Better for Species
For property owners, the ESA is a major concern.1 32 Under § 9,
landowners are prohibited from "taking" listed species. 33 Under this
provision, not only is it illegal for landowners to take endangered species
as the term "take" has historically been understood, but they must also
prevent any harm to listed species, including making changes to species'
habitat.134 This broad proscription can often pose a significant hurdle in
landowners' ability to make beneficial use of their property.' 35
The effect of § 9 on landowners is a primary reason for skepticism
of the ESA.136 As one author has noted, "[b]y shifting the burden of
species conservation to private property owners, the ESA has caused
people to fear species conservation instead of encouraging property
owners to become part of the solution by conserving species on their own
property."137 The fact that landowners are left uncompensated for any
endangered species protections they choose to implement on their land
further exacerbates this dilemma.' 38
Fear of the consequences arising from endangered species habitat
on private property is also justified by the judicial practice of
automatically tipping the scales of equity in favor of endangered
species. 139 This rule has encouraged plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief
132 See Meltz, supra note 4, passim.
i3 See 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2006).
134 See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 passim
(1995).
135 See Diana Kirchheim, Comment, The Endangered Species Act: Does 'Endangered'
Refer to Species, Private Property Rights, the Act Itself or All of the Above?, 22 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 803 passim (1999).
136 See id at 805.
138 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 4, at 997-1001.
139 See supra Part III.
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against non-federal actors to argue that the economic impacts of an
injunction are "irrelevant" and that any Fifth Amendment taking resulting
from an injunction "is not germane to the 'take' issue . . . because any
economic hardship posed by compliance with the ESA is simply not a
factor the court is permitted to consider in granting an injunction." 40
On the contrary, given the constitutional protection afforded to
property rights,141 any economic impacts resulting from an injunction on
the use of property would seem to be quite relevant. Indeed, all else being
equal, one might suppose that the balance of interests might presumptively
favor the property owner, with the environmental advocate having the
burden to prove the requisite necessity for an injunction.14 2
But, as courts are "destined to be players as they define the line
between public goal and constitutional right," 43 and as courts currently
presume protection of the former has precedence over the latter, merely
restoring equitable balance towards the property rights would seem to be
appropriate. Allowing for a full balancing of harms and consideration of
140 See Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Alleged Economic Impact
of Injunction, supra note 5, at 4.
141 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
142 Of course, "[t]raditional property rights sometimes collide with other constitutionally
protected rights, requiring the courts to strike a balance between competing values."
JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 167 (3d ed. 2007). But property rights should not be
afforded less protection in injunctive relief analyses, either by reason of the ESA or any
other legislative enactment. See id. at 174 ("If individuals or enterprises have only those
property rights that legislators choose to recognize, then property ownership is simply a
matter of legislative sufferance. No other important rights are treated in such a cavalier
fashion. Lawmakers often seek to benefit segments of society at the expense of property
owners."); see also TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, CORNERSTONE OF LIBERTY: PROPERTY RIGHTS
IN 21 ST-CENTURY AMERICA 112 (2006) (noting that "[i]n virtually every area of the law,
from asset forfeiture laws to environmental regulations to the rules governing building
permits and how to file lawsuits, private property is treated, in Chief Justice Rehnquist's
phrase, like 'a poor relation,' a second-class member of the Bill of Rights" and arguing
that "whether their goals are laudable or not, officials must learn to respect the private
property rights of people who do not share their vision, or who do not want to bear the
whole cost of providing a benefit to the public" (footnote call number omitted)).
143 Meltz, supra note 4, at 417.
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public interest would in no way preclude an injunction against non-federal
defendants.1 44 Moreover, by ensuring a full consideration of all relevant
interests, the ESA will be less of a perverse incentive for non-federal
actors to protect endangered species and will not be as likely to result in
non-federal actors withholding pertinent information on endangered
species. 145
IV. CONCLUSION
Several courts have held that the equitable traditions of balancing
the parties' harms and considering the public interest have no place when
it comes to preliminary injunctions under the ESA. Yet, as the case from
which this principle is derived is a narrow one, so too should the principle
itself be limited. Courts that apply TVA's injunctive relief standard to
preliminary injunctions against non-federal actors read TVA too broadly.
Instead, courts should more fully examine the limited circumstances of
TVA and note how the Court has recently limited the application of TVA.
Moreover, courts should restore equitable tradition in ESA preliminary
injunctive relief cases against non-federal actors because the Supreme
Court has affirmed the traditional approach to preliminary injunctive relief
and because doing so would better reflect the relationship between the
statutory protection afforded to endangered species and the constitutional
protection afforded to property rights.
4 See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987)
("Environmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by money
damages and is often permanent or at the least of long duration, i.e., irreparable. If such
injury is sufficiently likely, therefore, the balance of harms will usually favor the issuance
of an injunction to protect the environment.").
145 See Jonathan H. Adler, Money or Nothing: The Adverse Environmental Consequences
of Uncompensated Land Use Controls, 49 B.C. L. REv. 301, 332 (2008) ("The threat of
land use regulation under statutes like the ESA ... discourages private landowners from
disclosing information and cooperating with scientific research on their land, further
compromising species conservation efforts.").
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